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This essay is dedicated to Patricia Cox Miller, whose work ever expands the bound-
aries of scholarly imagination.
Carnal Excess: Flesh at the 
Limits of Imagination
VIRGINIA BURRUS
This essay explores representations of fleshly excess in Christian and Jewish 
texts of the late fourth and fifth centuries, from the cosmically-scaled figures of 
Adam and the resurrected Christ in Genesis Rabbah and Augustine’s City of 
God, on the one hand, to the hagiographical portraits of fat rabbis and monks 
in the tractate Baba Metsia of the Babylonian Talmud and the Lausiac History 
of Palladius, on the other. The Platonic figure of the khora is initially invoked 
to frame two main arguments: first, that these late ancient texts discover 
transcendence within, rather than outside of, the boundlessness of materiality; 
and, second, that this incarnational tendency has intriguing implications for 
practices and theories of representation and imagination. 
“The ‘boundless’ cannot be captured . . . but it can be imagined.”
—Patricia Cox Miller, “‘Plenty Sleeps There’:  
The Myth of Eros and Psyche”
How might one imagine boundless bodies? And why would one want to 
make such an attempt? Representations of carnal excess recur throughout 
late ancient religious texts, and I have found myself wondering what they 
might collectively signify. Flesh, it seems, is always more than needed or 
anticipated—always already too much—in the terms of the late ancient 
imagination. To say that flesh is too much is not, however, to imply that 
it should be less, or to wish it were not at all, but rather to point toward 
its fascinating elusiveness, its paradoxical relation to in/finitude. To say 
that flesh is too much is to invite the possibility, at once thrilling and hor-
rifying, that there might be even more. It is to link flesh, perhaps surpris-
ingly, with transcendence.
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1. As John Sallis puts it, with the discourse of the khora, Timaeus “makes a new, 
second start, producing a second discourse that is not continuous with the discourse 
interrupted” (Chorology: On Beginning in Plato’s Timaeus [Bloomington, IN: Indi-
ana University Press, 1999], 3).
2. Translation my own, from the Greek text printed in Plato, Timaeus, Critias, 
Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles, ed. R. G. Bury, LCL 234 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1929), 122, 124.
3. Sallis, Chorology, 122.
4. Sallis, Chorology, 132. The aspect of giving way or making way etymologically 
conveyed by khora is intriguingly resonant with the thirteenth-century Kabbalistic 
concept of simsum, “the primordial act of contraction and withdrawal of light that 
allows for the emanation of different worlds” (Elliot R. Wolfson, “Divine Suffering 
and the Hermeneutics of Reading: Philosophical Reflections on Lurianic Mythology,” 
in Suffering Religion, ed. Robert Gibbs and Elliot R. Wolfson [London: Routledge, 
2002], 101–62, citation at 117).
There is, of course, a prior history to this conceptualizing of carnal-
ity as transcendent excess. Plato’s Timaeus already associates materiality 
with the boundlessness of khora—itself a conceptual surplus of the Pla-
tonic text, strategically presented as an afterthought to an initial account 
of a world divinely created in accordance with the pattern of heavenly 
forms.1 Introduced as a “third genos” supplementing and also disrupt-
ing the more familiar categories of being and becoming, noetic original 
and sensible copy, khora is perceivable, we learn, neither by intellect nor 
by the senses but only indirectly and by a more mysterious faculty, desig-
nated a “bastard logos” and likened to the perception of one who dreams. 
Indeed, dreams seem to reveal a deeper truth, even as they lie: images are 
unmoored from the reality they might be thought to represent, each one 
emerging as “a phantom of something other . . . generated in something 
other, clinging to being, at least in a certain way, on pain of being nothing 
at all” (48e–52d).2 This something other that “makes possible the doubling 
of being in an image, the duplicity of being,” is none other than the elusive 
khora, suggests John Sallis.3 “Chorology” (as Sallis names it) thus spans 
the gap between oneirology and cosmology—or, perhaps better, opens up 
in that gap, where the creativity of the imagination and the generativity 
of the cosmos very nearly coincide, though neither is exactly an image 
of the other. Evoking both the receptivity that occurs in withdrawal—a 
“making way” for what has not been before—and the flux that underlies 
the cosmos as well as the imagination, khora can also be conceived, Sal-
lis notes, “as errancy: as hindering, diverting, leading astray the work of 
nous, as installing indeterminacy in what nous would otherwise render 
determinate.”4 
This unsettling figure is subsequently mis/translated (with a little help 
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5. Perhaps khora is always entering by the back door. As Sallis points out, the 
integrity of the noetic (also assumed by the Timaeus) depends on a negation of the 
interruptive khoric, yet this very negation appears to be doomed to failure. “Is it pos-
sible for negation to be absolute in every respect . . . ? Or is the negation of a certain 
spacing not itself another spacing?” (Chorology, 146). 
6. The possibility that a khora-like tehom might be liberated from the repressive 
clutches of the Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo lures constructive theologian 
Catherine Keller in her Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London: Rout-
ledge, 2003).
7. Patricia Cox Miller, “‘Plenty Sleeps There’: The Myth of Eros and Psyche,” in The 
Poetry of Thought in Late Antiquity: Essays in Imagination and Religion (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2001), 107–21, at 115. I previously pursued these insights from Miller’s work 
in “Creatio ex libidine: Reading ancient logos différantly,” in Sherwood and Hart, 
eds., Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments (London: Routledge, 2005), 141–56.
from Aristotle) into the more mundane concept of pre-existent matter 
(hyle), only to be refused altogether by the ex nihilo cosmologies of later 
antiquity. Yet something quite like the platonic khora lingers on, I want 
to suggest. The annihilating power of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is 
less total than it is often perceived to be. Indeed, precisely when frontally 
opposed by the nihil, khora seems to re-enter by the back door, so to speak.5 
When creation is positively asserted to come from nothing, that is, from 
what is neither pre-existent matter nor divine essence, khora regains its 
properly improper character: it reemerges as that dreamlike haunting of 
“things” that are (very nearly) “no-things at all,” as the realm of creation 
is cut loose from the over-determining being from which it has its genera-
tion, existing only in the groundless space of new possibility. Casting the 
shadow of a theological (as well as a cosmological) apophasis, khora may 
even begin to release God from the very being to which God is riveted by 
the ex nihilo itself: the negation of negation gives rise to its own negation, 
in other words, thereby revealing anew the face of divine depths—or, in 
more precisely scriptural terms, “the face of the deep (tehom)” (Gen 1.2).6 
A “third genos” now supplementing not platonic forms and their best-
possible imitations but a creative deity and its cosmic generations, the late 
ancient khora is timelessly enfolded in divinity even as it also unfurls in an 
ever-shifting world. Khora may, in fact, harbor the secret at the heart of 
much late ancient theology: if God is ever exceeding Godself by becom-
ing other (even other-than-being), then the infinite fullness or pleroma of 
divinity is, paradoxically, ever suffering its own becoming-finite. 
Or rather: pleromatic infinity and finite materiality turn out to be two 
aspects of the same khoric “flow at the heart of things,” as  Patricia Cox 
Miller so aptly dubs it.7 Divine creativity, we apprehend, entails tem-
poral and spatial articulation. Yet time is always folding back onto the 
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8. Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 
214, 216. Here and elsewhere the Latin text consulted is Augustine: Confessions, text 
and commentary by James O’Donnell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; on-
line reprint at http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/jod/conf/).
 boundlessness of eternity, and flesh, emerging as the excess of divine 
becoming, is always exceeding its own bounds. Such boundlessness can-
not be grasped, but it can be imagined—or dreamed. This essay will, 
then, explore the dreamlike images of carnal excess harbored in certain 
late ancient Christian and Jewish texts. As we shall see, exegetical mus-
ings on the elusive extremities of time, past or future, draw fantasies of 
a cosmic humanity swollen to near-divine proportions, while narratives 
of fat sages and saints seem to explode the ambivalence of presence. The 
topic of boundless materiality is itself in some important sense boundless, 
my own argument at once encompassing and encompassed by the texts 
invoked and engaged. On the one hand, I am gesturing toward a history of 
culturally-diffused ideas about embodiment that is “out there” (or “back 
then”); on the other, I am deliberately insinuating myself into that history 
by bringing together texts and figures that are, historically speaking, only 
loosely or indirectly related, but that nonetheless seem to me to call out 
to each other—and also, perhaps, to us.
“NOW WHAT AM I TO SAY ABOUT THE HAIR  
AND THE NAILS?” RESURRECTED BODIES  
IN AUGUSTINE’S CITY OF GOD
In his Confessions, Christian theologian Augustine gives considerable 
attention to the role of the imagination in relation to memory, which he 
describes as “a great field or a spacious palace, a storehouse for countless 
images of all kinds.” Even the unfathomable archives of memory’s “vast, 
immeasurable sanctuary” (10.8) prove inadequate when he attempts to 
imagine the unchangeable God, however.8 Augustine dramatizes the frus-
trating experience, retrojected onto a disavowed Manichaean past: “My 
heart was full of bitter protests against the creations of my imagination, and 
this single truth [immutability] was the only weapon with which I could 
try to drive from my mind’s eye all the unclean images which swarmed 
before it,” he avows. 
But hardly had I brushed them aside than, in the flicker of an eyelid, they 
crowded upon me again, forcing themselves upon my sight and clouding 
my vision, so that although I did not imagine you in the shape of a human 
body, I could not free myself from the thought that you were some kind of 
BURRUS/CARNAL EXCESS   251
9. Augustine, Confessions (trans. Pine-Coffin), 133.
10. Augustine, Confessions (trans. Pine-Coffin), 82, translation slightly modified. 
11. Translations my own.
12. On Augustine’s curious discussion of the nihil aliquid in his exegesis of Gen 
1.2, see Keller, Face of the Deep, 74–75.
bodily substance extended in space, either permeating the world or diffused 
in infinity beyond it. (7.1)9 
As a catholic Christian, he will later turn to the figure of Christ in an 
attempt to understand how divinity can be at once incorporeal and incar-
nate, infinite and implicated in finitude. Intriguingly, he locates that fig-
ure in “a secret place,” a “virginal womb,”—a “third genos,” one might 
say—that is neither divinity nor flesh but rather that which demarcates 
the possibility of their mutual traversibility. Taking his cue from Psalm 
18.6–7, Augustine is still thinking big, however: “Then, ‘as a bridegroom 
coming from his bed, he exulted like some giant (gigans) who sees the 
track before him.’” Descending, ascending, withdrawing, remaining, this 
gigantic, racing Christ is everywhere because also nowhere, in constant 
motion because also still: “He departed but he is here with us. . . . He 
went back to the place which he never left . . .” (4.12).10
If divine immutability continues to challenge Augustine’s imaginative 
powers, so too does the “not altogether nothing (non omnino nihil)” of 
“formless materiality (informis materia)” (12.3)—the “nothing-something 
(nihil aliquid)” (12.6)—from which he understands the immutable God 
to have created the cosmos, as recorded in Genesis 1.2. Now making a 
mental effort to erase form so as to imagine not sheer divinity but bare 
matter, he merely manages to multiply form, picturing “numerous and 
varied” shapes that are “hideous and horrible,” distortions so “bizarre 
and incongruous” that if they had actually manifested before his eyes he 
would have been psychologically undone. Exhausted by the visual shuffle 
of hybrid and unstable figures generated by his own imagination, he sub-
sequently surmises that changeability itself must be the shifting substrate, 
the pretemporal (or, more properly, nontemporal) nihil aliquid around 
which he has been trying vainly to wrap his mind. If only he could capture 
the moment of transition between forms—if only he could perceive that 
which “comprehends all the forms”! Then he would be able to see through 
time to eternity and know mutability in and as the fertile betweenness that 
is the womb of flesh’s excess (12.6).11 The moment is always vanishing, 
however, and the mind cannot contain a truth that overflows time.12
To restate the point: if God, as Augustine imagines it (however imper-
fectly), takes up all the space and then some, thereby evading temporality, 
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13. The following discussion of resurrected bodies in Augustine’s City of God 
grows out of an essay co-authored with Karmen MacKendrick, entitled “Bodies 
without Wholes: Apophatic Excess and Fragmentation in Augustine’s City of God,” 
to appear in Apophatic Bodies, edited by Christopher Boesel and Catherine Keller, 
forthcoming with Fordham University Press. I thank Dr. MacKendrick both for this 
collaboration and for allowing me to continue to share her insights.
14. Elliot R. Wolfson, Alef, Mem, Tau: Kabbalistic Musings on Time, Truth, Death 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006), 92. Wolfson offers a nuanced and 
innovative theory of time based on (but not confined to) kabbalistic texts that seems 
to capture very well the often underestimated complexities of Augustine’s thought. 
See also his particular discussion of Augustine at 3–11, 16, 75. 
creation takes up all the time and then some, thereby exploding spatiality: 
there is no place—except the “no place” of khora, or a virgin’s womb?—
that can hold all of its changing forms at once. No time outside eternity, 
no place but the infinitely extended divine. In the meantime (in time), 
Augustine plays God, hovering over the depths of his own memory palace. 
What he creates is, of course, but a temporal image of creation’s boundless 
bounty—indeed, a nightmarishly monstrous conglomeration of unclean 
images, signaling at once a deficiency and an excess of bodily form that 
breaks the closure of teleology by overloading its possibilities. 
Yet in the City of God (a later text) Augustine cannot resist trying to 
imagine the unimaginable once again.13 Here, as in his Confessions, if on 
a grander scale, temporality is strained, even stretched to the limit. Past 
fictions, future hopes, present possibilities—all point to the event of incar-
nation, the event that takes place in a fathomless moment of no duration. 
In that event, time is intensely eternalized—“so fully in the moment that it 
can have no past or future and, consequently, no re/presentable present”—
and eternity is richly temporalized.14 But how can one imagine such an 
exceeding fecundity of eternity harbored within time’s measured steps? 
In this work, Augustine ultimately directs his gaze not to the “nothing-
something” of unformed matter that surfaces from the depths of the ini-
tial verses of Genesis but rather to the resurrected bodies unveiled in the 
culminating spectacles of the Apocalypse.
En route to flesh’s unimaginable future, anticipated in the resurrection 
and ascension of Christ, Augustine detours through an unbelievable past, 
taking his cue from the observed oddities of the present—which just might 
take both belief and imagination over their limits. In book fourteen, for 
example, he evokes instances of human abilities “remarkable by their 
very rarity” to hint at the extremes of submission and control that would 
have characterized sex in paradise—had there only been time for it! There 
are some people, he reports, who “can do things with their body which 
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15. Augustine, Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bet-
tenson (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972), 588.
16. Augustine, Concerning the City of God (trans. Bettenson), 639.
are for others utterly impossible and well nigh incredible when they are 
reported.” Like what? Well, wiggle their ears or move their scalps; swal-
low improbable items and regurgitate them on command; make uncannily 
inhuman sounds such as bird calls; create music by passing odorless gas 
through their anuses; sweat or cry at will; or even detach themselves from 
all sensation (14.24).15 In book fifteen, he similarly introduces contempo-
rary examples of the bizarre in order to corroborate biblical reports of the 
past, in this case the existence of giants: “Was there not in Rome a few 
years ago . . . a woman . . . who towered far above all other inhabitants 
with a stature which could be called gigantic? An amazing crowd rushed 
to see her, wherever she went. And what excited special wonder was the 
fact that both her parents were not even as tall as the tallest people that 
we see in our everyday experience” (15.23).16 
By the time Augustine reaches the final book twenty-two, much of 
which is devoted to the discussion of resurrected bodies, the world has 
become strange indeed. Miracles multiply at such a rate that any sense of 
the limits of the natural or normal is not merely exceeded but very nearly 
undone. If the particular miracles recorded in scripture necessarily loom 
large in popular awareness, Augustine wants also to call our attention to 
the ongoing, paradoxically quotidian, irruption of marvelous events that 
typically remain overlooked even by the people in the very communities 
where they occur. Relatively well known, he avers, is the case of the blind 
man of Milan whose sight was restored when the bodies of the martyrs 
Protasius and Gervasius were discovered by Bishop Ambrose. Less well 
known, however, is the astonishing cure of a deeply buried rectal fistula 
that Augustine himself has witnessed—and now narrates at what might be 
deemed excessive length. This strange story swiftly gives rise to other tales 
of healing: breast cancer, gout, hernias, demonic infestations, paralysis, 
coma, and a dislodged eyeball are all among the ills miraculously cured 
yet too little talked about, Augustine feels. An underdressed man is unex-
pectedly granted money for a coat. Children’s corpses are revived, and this 
happens more than once. In the face of such excess, Augustine is beside 
himself: “Now what am I to do? . . . I cannot relate all the stories of mira-
cles that I know.” Yet he also cannot resist sharing a few more. Indeed, he 
seems quite overwhelmed by the impossibility of his self-appointed task of 
making all miracles known to all: God knows he has tried, but it is simply 
not feasible for any bishop, however diligent, to impress these tales on the 
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17. Augustine, Concerning the City of God (trans. Bettenson), 1033–47.
18. Augustine, Concerning the City of God (trans. Bettenson), 1054.
19. Augustine, Concerning the City of God (trans. Bettenson), 1054–55.
20. Augustine, Concerning the City of God (trans. Bettenson), 1055–56.
21. Augustine, Concerning the City of God (trans. Bettenson), 1057–58.
memories of the entirety of God’s people. Even those who have heard the 
stories “do not keep in their minds what they have heard” (22.8).17
If the miracles of this world exceed the capacity of the mind, so too 
do the miracles of the world to come. Or rather, the miraculous is what 
spans the two worlds or “cities.” But how is one to imagine bodies in the 
other world—resurrected bodies? Can Augustine’s excitedly cited instances 
of miracles already witnessed provide enough of a clue as to what lies 
ahead? Aided now not so much by the credulity of the faithful as by the 
incredulity of questioning skeptics, he reaches for the limit cases that will 
expand his imagination. Does resurrected life begin before birth, and if so 
when? Will a miscarried infant be resurrected (22.13)?18 These are fruitful 
 queries in their very strangeness. Consideration of tiny humans, whether 
pre- or post-natal, gives rise to the further question of the size of resur-
rected bodies—no small matter, as it happens. What does flesh unfolded 
in time look like, from the perspective of eternity? What if there was no 
time for its unfolding, in the case of babies—much as there turned out to 
be no time for sex in Paradise? Augustine answers confidently with regard 
to those who die as infants: “By a marvelous and instantaneous act of God 
they will gain that maturity they would have attained by the slow lapse of 
time.” There will be no loss of flesh—no loss even of flesh’s potential—in 
the resurrection, he assures his readers. If anything, there will be gain in 
excess of expectation. At this point, Augustine toys with the idea of a sort 
of heavenly egalitarianism that would eliminate all differences of stature, 
in which case—he is sure—God would add extra matter “so that all would 
attain the stature of giants” rather than unfairly diminish the gigantic pro-
portions achieved by some (22.14).19 He rejects this possibility, however, 
in favor of the notion that each individual will embody the height that he 
or she had, or would have had, at the age Christ achieved—roughly thirty 
years (22.15).20 Just as differences in height will be preserved so too will 
sexual difference, he further elaborates (22.17).21
Nonetheless, the possibility of gigantic stature reemerges, and it does so 
precisely in the context of Augustine’s affirmation of the preservation of 
the particularities of difference, when he turns to address another of the 
questions raised by skeptics, regarding lost body parts. “Now what reply 
am I to make about the hair and the nails?” he asks. It would seem that the 
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22. Interestingly, hair and nails seem to present a problem of excess for Plato as 
well, though not an identical problem. While he can just barely imagine the possible 
usefulness of hair as a relatively non-burdensome shelter for the head, the function 
of fingernails escapes him (Tim. 76d). He solves the problem of such apparent super-
fluity by suggesting that fingernails were incorporated into the human prototype out 
of concern for other kinds of creatures—including women!—that would be derived 
from it: “For those who were constructing us knew that out of men women should 
one day spring and all other animals; and they understood, moreover, that many 
of these creatures would need for many purposes the help of nails; wherefore they 
impressed upon men at their very birth the rudimentary structure of finger-nails” 
(76e; Plato, Timaeus, etc., trans. Bury, 203). Perhaps Plato’s gods foresaw the cur-
rent popularity of manicures.
23. Augustine, Concerning the City of God (trans. Bettenson), 1060–62.
24. Augustine, Concerning the City of God (trans. Bettenson), 1063.
bits cut off from each body must be restored in the body’s eternity (he has 
already promised that nothing will be lost!), yet the insult to beauty that 
would be presented by the resulting excesses of hair or toenails presents a 
problem for Augustine (if not for the long-tressed Mary of Egypt).22 Thus 
he suggests the analogy of a potter reshaping a pot: “All that is required is 
that the whole pot should be remade out of the whole lump, that is, that all 
the clay should go back into the whole pot, with nothing left over.” This 
has implications for more than the reincorporation of cut-off (or otherwise 
lost, discarded, or even excreted) parts, as it also allows for a reshaping 
of form more generally, arranging differently what is too fat or too thin, 
for example, while each body still retains its distinctiveness somehow, as 
tellingly preserved in the transcendent beauty of scars (22.19).23 Surely, 
however, such a conservationist stance implies that resurrected bodies will 
be either significantly bigger or much, much denser, if all that ever belonged 
to them, across time, is reintegrated. (Would they not extend almost infi-
nitely?) Augustine admits as much, after taking what is a rather bizarre 
(even for him) detour through the perplexing digestive issues raised by 
cannibalism (what flesh belongs to whom?). He does so despite his con-
tinued attraction to the notion that resurrected bodies will preserve their 
original (or potential) mature height: “there may be some addition to the 
stature as a result of this,” he confesses (22.20).24 Even when a limit has 
been set at a Christlike thirtysomething, the body still exceeds. 
Caroline Walker Bynum asserts that for Augustine “resurrection is res-
toration both of bodily material and of bodily wholeness or integrity, with 
incorruption (which includes—for the blessed—beauty, weightlessness, 
and impassibility) added on.” She charges him with “a profound fear of 
development and process” that results in a view of “salvation as the crys-
talline hardness not only of stasis but of the impossibility of non-stasis.” 
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25. Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 
200–1336 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 95, 97, 99.
26. Neoplatonism’s idealism may be overrated. But this doesn’t really change the 
point.
27. David Dawson, “Transcendence as Embodiment: Augustine’s Domestication 
of Gnosis,” Modern Theology 10 (1994): 1–26, citation at 3–4.
28. Dawson, “Transcendence as Embodiment,” 7–8.
While admitting that “Augustine’s insistence on keeping minute details 
of the heavenly body close to the earthly one” is quite striking, she notes 
again that he does so “while adding (a crucial addition of course!) sta-
sis.”25 I am here questioning, however, whether “add stasis, and stir” to 
turn human bodies that are both scarred and mutable—both fragmenting 
and excessive—into flawless marble statues is a formula that adequately 
captures Augustine’s approach, as if he were thereby seeking a recipe for 
balance between Neoplatonic transcendentalism and Christian incarna-
tionalism. Augustine’s thought seems much stranger, his additive fantasies 
much more transgressive than that. 
More appealing is David Dawson’s suggestion that Augustine should be 
seen as departing rather decisively from Neoplatonic idealism26 by positing 
incarnation as the site of transcendence: divinity exceeds itself in a process 
of “becoming embodied,” and humanity appropriates this movement, thus 
also exceeding itself by becoming “more embodied.”27 For Dawson, how-
ever, Augustine finally chooses incarnationalism instead of the apophati-
cism that carries him past the boundaries of imagination.28 It seems to me, 
however, that the incarnational and the apophatic—similarly, imagination 
and the unimaginable—converge at their extremes in Augustine’s thought. 
This is nowhere more evident than in his (dramatically and productively 
failed) attempts to imagine resurrected bodies. Resurrected bodies are tran-
scendent not because they are static or weightless, as Bynum suggests, but 
because they are the most embodied. Emerging at the disappearing bor-
der of time and eternity, they are so much body that they utterly exceed 
wholeness, no matter how hard one tries to stuff all the leftover fragments 
back into the bag of integrity—and try, Augustine does. They are so much 
body that they utterly exceed representation, no matter how inventively 
one rearranges the available images—and inventive, Augustine is. In rela-
tion to the forms of representation, resurrected bodies are nihil aliquid, 
nothing-something—so many miracles and monsters. Resurrected bodies 
manifest where metamorphosis displaces mimesis, in and as the exceeding 
beauty of becoming and the fragmenting desire for disintegration.
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29. Genesis Rabbah: The Judaic Commentary to the Book of Genesis, vol. 1, trans. 
and commentary by Jacob Neusner (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1985), 73.
30. All free-standing biblical citations are from the NRSV translation.
31. Genesis Rabbah (trans. Neusner), 73.
32. David H. Aaron notes that Moshe Idel “finds no evidence in the early history 
of the term for this connotation” but sees the golem as a formed, yet huge, entity 
(Idel, Golem [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990], 298, cited by 
Aaron, “Imagery of the Divine and the Human: On the Mythology of Genesis Rabba 
8 § 1,” The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 5 [1995]: 1–62, at 57). 
33. Genesis Rabbah (trans. Neusner), 264.
34. Aaron, “Imagery of the Divine and Human,” 55–59.
“HE WAS SPREAD FROM ONE END OF THE WORLD TO 
THE OTHER”: THE COSMIC ADAM IN GENESIS RABBAH
According to a roughly contemporaneous rabbinic exegetical tradition 
that seems to strain at the same imaginal limits as Augustine does, the first 
human was both formally indistinct (or alternately formally multiple) and 
incredibly huge: “R. Tanhuma in the name of R. Benaiah, R. Berekhiah in 
the name of R. Eleazar, ‘He created him as an unformed mass (golem), and 
he was spread from one end of the world to the other’” (Genesis Rabbah 
8.1).29 This assertion arises in the context of an interpretation of Genesis 
1.26–28. It comes, more precisely, on the heels of an interpretation of verse 
27 (“So God created humankind [ha adam] in his image, in the image of 
God he created them; male and female he created them”)30 that has been 
fluidly displaced onto Genesis 5.2 (“Male and female he created them and 
he blessed them and named them humankind [adam]”), from which R. 
Jeremiah b. Eleazar infers: “When the Holy One, blessed be he, came to 
create the first human, he made it androgynous.” R. Samuel bar Nahman 
adds that “the Holy One” created the first human with two faces and sub-
sequently sawed it in two.31 Perhaps it is the multiplicity of genders in the 
original, unhewn “Adam” that suggests both a lack of stable form and a 
surplus of mass—a wondrous monstrosity, in short.
The assertion that the first human lacks stable form is, however, also 
anchored in the particular language of Psalm 139.16: “Your eyes beheld 
my golem.” Whether the term golem (which appears nowhere else in the 
Hebrew Bible) should here be rendered “unformed mass” is in fact dis-
puted:32 elsewhere in Genesis Rabbah (24.2),33 the verse is interpreted to 
indicate that the creature is both massive in size and that it contains the 
generations to descend from it, but not necessarily that it is formless or 
embryonic, as is sometimes suggested.34 Nonetheless, the unformed mate-
riality that Augustine also discovered in Genesis 1.2 lies close at hand, 
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37. Genesis Rabbah (trans. Neusner), 76; 3. Not unlike Confessions 12, the rab-
binic commentary seems to occupy an ambiguous space between the doctrines of 
creation from pre-existent matter and creation from nothing. Maren Niehoff detects 
Christian influence in the most stridently ex nihilo passages of Genesis Rabbah; e.g., 
1.9, where Gamaliel curses a philosopher who suggests that the Jewish God creates 
from pre-existent materials (“Creatio Ex Nihilo Theology in Genesis Rabbah in Light 
of Christian Exegesis,” Harvard Theological Review 99 [2005]: 37–64). I myself am 
struck by the paradox of hiddenness and disclosure that is sustained with regard to 
divine creativity, as un/veiled in—and as!—Torah. Torah contains the unutterable 
secrets of creation, perceivable only through the bastard logic of a dreamer, it would 
seem: “R. Huna in the name of Bar Qappara: ‘Were the matter not explicitly writ-
ten in Scripture, it would not be possible to state it at all: “God created heaven and 
earth” (Gen 1.1)—from what? From the following: “And the earth was chaos” (Gen 
1.2)’” (Genesis Rabbah 1.5). Chaos (tohu va-bohu): another name for the unname-
able “nothing- something” that falls outside the binary oppositions of the philosopher 
and his interlocutor, for whom there is either something or nothing.
textually speaking, and Genesis Rabbah 8.1 will soon circle around to 
just that verse, linking it with Isaiah 11.2—“the spirit of the Lord shall 
rest on him”—in order to read Genesis 1.2 as a reference to the creation 
of the first human, thereby aligning the golem with the “face of the deep” 
over which the spirit hovered.35 Here the newly formed Adam does seem 
almost to fold back, embryonically, toward the formless void, even as it 
also begins to unfurl its generative potencies—the multiforms of its poten-
tial generations.36 In so far as golem displaces tehom, it becomes (almost) 
possible to imagine the unimaginable, that which Augustine dubs the 
“nothing-something” and which the rabbis pronounce “hidden” (Genesis 
Rabbah 8.2; see also 1.5).37
All of these interpretive moves are themselves folded into discussion 
of the expository verse that introduces the exegesis of Genesis 1.26–28 
in Genesis Rabbah 8.1, a verse drawn from the same Psalm that harbors 
the golem—“You beset me behind and before and lay your hand upon 
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R. Wolfson, Through a Speculum That Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval 
Jewish Mysticism [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994], 23).
me” (Ps 139.5). Perhaps precisely because it seems at first to have so little 
relevance for the account of humanity’s creation, the verse explodes with 
interpretive possibilities as it intersects with the lemma, or text at hand. 
Initially it is read with reference to humanity’s doubled inheritance—“this 
world and the world to come”—as well as God’s ultimate judgment: the 
human “must come and give a full accounting of himself.”38 Subsequently 
it is retranslated, under the authority of R. Eleazar, “West and east you 
have formed me,” thereby indicating, in harmony with Deut 4.32 (“From 
one end of the heaven to the other end of the heaven”), the vast expanse 
of the first human. Alternately, it may suggest that the human is verti-
cally as well as horizontally extended, since it is apparently tall enough 
to reach God’s heavenly hand (a possibility seemingly confirmed by Job 
13.21: “Withdraw your hand from me”). Or it may refer to the span of 
time in which the human is emerging, from the initial hovering of the 
spirit of God over the face of the deep to the sixth day of creation when 
God declares, “Let us make a human.”39 This last interpretive possibility 
brings us back finally both to Genesis 1.26–28 and to verse 2, hovering 
nearby in the same chapter and hinting, moreover, at a near conflation of 
the newly or not quite formed Adam with the formless depths of divine 
creativity, as we have already seen. 
Intertextual larding has by now fattened the Genesis verses to the point 
that they burst all imaginable textual boundaries. It has also yielded a 
boundless Adam who spans all worlds, genders, spatial dimensions, and 
temporalities. “He is the first and last, spirit and body, otherworldly and 
this worldly, a future being and a present being,” as Susan Niditch notes.40 
If this golem seems almost to dissolve into the faceless deep of creation’s 
infinite potentiality, it also closely resembles Augustine’s frustrated attempt 
to imagine God: “some kind of bodily substance extended in space, either 
permeating the world or diffused in infinity beyond it.”41 Moreover, like 
the resurrected bodies regathered at the end of time, the gigantic Adam 
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emerging at the dawn of time straddles temporality and eternity. Spread thin 
across the six days of cosmic differentiation, or else finding its Sabbath “so 
fully in the moment that it can have no past or future and, consequently, 
no re/presentable present,”42 creation is ever exceeding all bounds.
“THEIRS ARE BIGGER THAN OURS”:  
FAT RABBIS AND MONKS IN TRACTATE BABA METSIA 
AND PALLADIUS’S LAUSIAC HISTORY
With that sense of slight trepidation that attends the mixing of unlike 
things, I want now to shift from the ambiguously mythical to the more 
concretely carnal, perhaps also from the sublime to the comical. Borrow-
ing a page from Augustine’s City of God, as well, I want to think about 
what representations of actual overlarge bodies (like that of his extremely 
tall Roman lady) might have to say about materiality as cosmic excess—
or the cosmos itself as divine excess. Of particular interest are fat bodies 
that serve as icons of holiness, specifically those on display in the collective 
hagiographies of both patristic and rabbinic traditions.43 Contrary to what 
one might expect, neither saints nor sages are particularly idealized in such 
works, in either their moral or their physical depictions. In fact, the liter-
ary images of rabbis and monks seem to subvert classical aesthetic ideals. 
Or rather: they seem to overflow the boundaries of the classic body.
I begin with a story from Tractate Baba Metsia of the Babylonian 
Talmud, which constitutes, among other things, a virtual Lives of Fat 
Rabbis. 
When Rabbi Ishma’el the son of Yose and Rabbi El‘azar the son of Rabbi 
Shim‘on used to meet each other, an ox could walk between them [under 
the arch formed by their bellies] and not touch them.
A certain matron said to them, “Your children are not yours.” 
They said, “Theirs [i.e., our wives’] are bigger than ours.” 
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“If that is the case, even more so!”
There are those who say that thus they said to her: “As the man, so is his 
virility.” And there are those who say that thus did they say to her: “Love 
compresses the flesh.” (Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metsia 84a)44
Here two obese rabbis deflect mockery through clever quips about their 
wives’ size when an unfriendly interlocutor insinuates that they are too fat 
to have fathered their children—in itself, no laughing matter for either the 
rabbis or their wives. The mocking matrona (a stock figure) is unmistak-
ably Roman.45 The redactors of the Talmud muse aloud: “But why did they 
respond to her?” We might also ask why they responded as they did. Per-
haps the rabbis are offering a deliberately “Gentile” reply to their Roman 
interlocutor, if an intertext like that of the Hellenistic writer Philostratus’s 
early third-century tale of the fat sophist Leon of Byzantium is operating 
knowingly.46 When mocked by the fractious Athenians for his large belly, 
Leon is said to respond: “I have a wife at home who is much stouter than 
I, and when we agree the bed is large enough for us both, but when we 
quarrel not even the house is large enough” (Philostratus, Lives of the 
Sophists 1.485). Yet the would-be table-turning rejoinder—“our wives’ 
are bigger than ours!”— seems an inept echo of Leon’s witty repartee—
as if the rabbis, both notorious imperial collaborators,47 nonetheless fail 
to master the master’s idiom even well enough to counter the challenges 
of the master’s wife. Why, after all, should the greater size of their own 
wives’ bellies prove any defense against charges that their children are 
illegitimate? Then again, perhaps it’s not bellies they’re talking about but 
genitalia—or, as the medieval commentator Rashi puts it tactfully, the size 
of their sexual desire.48 The matrona, at any rate, is not impressed by the 
262   JOURNAL OF EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES
 initially meant genitalia, the matrona understood bellies. The ambiguity continues in 
a subsequent passage regarding the size of rabbinic “limbs,” as the cryptic brevity 
of the language multiplies interpretive possibilities. There is even the possibility of a 
homoerotic implication to the matrona’s charge since, afterall, it is the visual image 
of the two male bodies that initially seems to invoke anxiety about how they are to 
couple; moreover, the discussion of the size of “limbs” in this passage directly links 
El‘azar and Ishmael to Yohanan, a figure famed for his womanlike beauty, which once 
attracted the amorous attentions of Resh Lakish. El‘azar is also a significant figure in 
the medieval Zohar, where he is associated with the “homoeroticism of the mystical 
fraternity,” as discussed by Wolfson, Through a Speculum, 370–71. 
49. See Boyarin, Carnal Israel, 197–225, for an explicitly Bakhtinian reading of 
the Talmudic tale.
50. See Boyarin, Unheroic Conduct, 99–107, on El‘azar’s masochistic regime.
rabbis’ response and continues to cast aspersions on their paternity. The 
tradition is split regarding their final triumphant rejoinder. According to 
one account, the rabbis hint that the size of their penises is proportion-
ate to the size of their bellies. According to another account, the rabbis’ 
explanation is similar to that of Philostratus’s Leon, albeit more graphi-
cally presented, namely, that where there is harmonious love, the size of 
the body (or of certain parts of the body) simply doesn’t matter: flesh 
makes way for desire.
The carnivalesque exuberance of the rabbinic tale49—in particular its 
bawdy shamelessness with regard to the sexual—makes it difficult to 
imagine a Christian version of this tale, perhaps. Yet there are other parts 
of Rabbi El‘azar’s story that cut even closer to the flesh and thereby also 
bring us much closer to narratives of Christian holy men, some of whom 
are notable for their swollen bodies, but none of whom are credited with 
wives, whether fat or thin. 
El‘azar is known, as it happens, not only for his great size and unfortu-
nate collaboration with Rome but also for his delicate conscience. Once, 
in a fit of pique at a man who has mocked him for not being as great a 
rabbi as his father Shimon, El‘azar turns the man’s name in for execu-
tion. He quickly repents of such hasty action, but it is too late: the man 
has already been hanged. Learning from others that the hanged man was 
indeed a serious sinner, El‘azar is still not fully comforted. His disciples 
set out to reassure him by a most curious test, inspired by a tradition that 
the bodies of righteous men do not decay: they give him a sedative and 
cut open his belly, removing several basketsful of fat and placing it in 
the hot sun to see if it will rot. It does not rot, thus proving that El‘azar 
is indeed a righteous man. Still, El‘azar continues to suffer doubts about 
his own judgment, “and he accepted painful disease on himself” for this 
reason.50 “In the evening they used to fold under him sixty felt mats, and 
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in the morning they would find under him sixty vessels full of blood and 
pus.” He refers to his afflictions as his “brothers and companions” but he 
sends them away in the day so that they will not interfere with his study 
of Torah. His wife initially tends him diligently and also “would not let 
him go to the study-house, in order that the Rabbis would not reject him” 
but eventually she loses patience with his cult of suffering and leaves him. 
Others—men (sixty sailors in fact!)—care for him thereafter and under 
their ministrations he allows himself to be cured and returns to the study 
house, where he delivers controversially liberal opinions on the purity 
of the bloodstained garments of sixty women (Baba Metsia 83b–84b).51 
Thus by the end of his life El‘azar looks much like a monk, having courted 
physical suffering and taken on a non-marital life within a community of 
men. His rewards are great: later Zoharic tradition identifies him, along 
with his father Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Abba, as one of the three to have 
looked on the face of the divine Presence.52
A nightly shedding of sixty bowlfuls of blood might seem excessive even 
as penance for having sent a man to what might have been (though in the 
end was not) an unjust death. But excess is precisely the point, a point 
also echoed by many of the tales recorded in Palladius’s roughly contem-
poraneous Lausiac History. Indeed sin may even be embraced in so far as 
it leads to an excess of penitential suffering. Take for example Macarius 
the Younger, a happy shepherd youth who at age eighteen accidentally kills 
someone, an incident that leads him to live alone in the desert for three 
years without shelter and for another twenty-five years in a self-built cell. 
He confides to Palladius that he rejoices in his “sin of homicide,” “since 
it was actually the starting point of his salvation” (15).53 Another Mac-
arius, this one of Alexandria, reflexively kills not a man but a gnat that 
has stung him on the foot. Palladius reports: 
He accused himself of acting out of revenge and he condemned himself 
to sit naked in the marsh of Scete out in the great desert for a period of 
six months. Here the mosquitoes lacerate even the hides of the wild swine 
just as wasps do. Soon he was bitten all over his body, and he became so 
swollen that some thought he had elephantiasis. When he returned to his 
cell after six months he was recognized as Macarius only by his voice. 
(18.4)54
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Other holy men included in Palladius’s history suffer merely circumstan-
tially and through no fault of their own, yet their suffering is thereby no 
less productive. Consider the following account:
In this mountain at Nitria there was a man named Benjamin who had lived 
eighty years and attained the height of ascetic perfection. He was deemed 
worthy of the gift of healing. . . . Now this man . . . contracted dropsy 
about eight months before he died. He body swelled up to such a size that 
he seemed to be another Job. . . . So we went and saw his body so greatly 
swollen that another person’s fingers could not reach around one of his. . . . 
For eight months, then, a very wide seat was set out for him on which he 
sat all the time. He was no longer able to lie down, because of other needs. 
Even in this great sickness he cured others. . . . When he died, the door and 
jamb were pulled down so that his body could be carried out of the house, 
so great was his swelling. (12)55
Resonant especially with the Talmudic tale is the graphic description of 
fleshly excess. In this text, the fat monk carries his excessive flesh explicitly 
as an affliction. For Benjamin, however, the obscurely humiliating bur-
den of carnality does not ultimately prove compressible any more than 
it is rendered funny but instead seems to increase and multiply beyond 
the limits of imagination, not unlike El‘azar’s basketfuls of fat or bowl-
fuls of blood: his corpse cannot even be squeezed through the door of his 
house. (Interestingly, El‘azar’s corpse does not leave the house for many 
years either but resides in his estranged wife’s attic. Surely a case of excess 
flesh!) The words placed in the mouth of Bishop Dioscorus regarding the 
fat monk Benjamin are instructive: “Come here, see a new Job who pos-
sesses boundless gratitude while in a state of great bodily swelling and 
incurable sickness.”56 The boundlessness of Benjamin’s gratitude, marked 
by his continued gift for curing others while remaining himself without 
cure, is matched by the apparent boundlessness of his pathologically swol-
len flesh. The culmination of a life of ascetic perfection is an excess of 
spiritual grace coinciding with an excess of shameful flesh. 
Put otherwise: the depths of humiliated flesh and the heights of divine 
holiness converge at their extreme limits in the tale of the fat monk. That 
there is a link between the fleshly and the divine is also hinted in the more 
overtly comical—as well as frankly sexual—tales of fat rabbis. The incar-
national perspective—the turn to the flesh—can and does take many forms 
in late antiquity but it cannot evade the plunge into abjection precisely 
because late ancient incarnationalism is transcendental in its aspirations—
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as the excessive bodies of the first human and the final resurrection also 
attest. What is reached for is something that exceeds the classically beau-
tiful body, the contained body, the controlled body of a prior cultural 
imagination—in part by driving that classic body to, and beyond, its lim-
its.57 In an effort to demonstrate his incorruptibility, El‘azar spills his guts. 
(It is our exceeding brokenness, not our wholeness, that defends us from 
impurity—to paraphrase a rabbinic dictum.) Having achieved the heights 
of holiness marked by the gift of healing, Benjamin becomes incurably fat. 
(His boundless flesh matches his boundless grace—as bishop Dioscorus 
notes.) There is an excess of carnality where the divine spirit falls. 
IN CONCLUSION: DREAMING BIG
In late antiquity, “dreams formed a distinctive pattern of imagination 
which brought visual presence and tangibility to such abstract concepts as 
time, cosmic history, the soul, and the identity of one’s self,” writes Miller. 
“Dreams were tropes that allowed the world . . . to be represented.”58 In 
the Timaeus, the “distinctive pattern of imagination” associated with the 
tropic fecundity of dreams is attributed to their groundless ground, which 
Plato names khora. Such abyssal imagistic abundance is also manifest, I 
am suggesting, in certain patristic and rabbinic texts that seem to exceed 
both the abstract and the literal, generating worlds of story and image 
that lend “visual presence and tangibility” to what could not otherwise 
be perceived by either the senses or the intellect—“the flow at the heart of 
things.” Call it khora, tehom, or even a “bastard” logos, if you like. “Call it 
a God if you wish.”59 Call it carnal excess. As Patricia Cox Miller, as much 
as anyone, has taught us, the late ancient imagination was tuned to the 
intensely incarnational, in which the presence of spirit was also discerned. 
The transcendence of flesh, the flesh of transcendence: the boundless is too 
big to grasp. But we can dream, we can try to imagine . . . 
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